Buying Groups under the Robinson-Patman Act by Palmer, Roy C.
Chicago-Kent Law Review 
Volume 42 Issue 2 Article 11 
October 1965 
Buying Groups under the Robinson-Patman Act 
Roy C. Palmer 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Roy C. Palmer, Buying Groups under the Robinson-Patman Act, 42 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 143 (1965). 
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol42/iss2/11 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in Chicago-Kent Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT 






F OR SOME FORTY YEARS' the Federal Trade Commission has been
wrestling with the problems created by cooperative buying
groups. In every litigated case except one,2 the Commission has
ruled that the buying group activities violated the Clayton Act.
Nevertheless, buying groups continue to flourish and grow. Ironi-
cally, one of the most important functions of the Commission is
to protect small business, and yet, in this area, the Commission is
bringing case after case against the small businessman.
A buying group is an organization of purchasers, pooling
their purchases, in order to obtain a better price than that which
would be available to them individually. The organizational form
is immaterial. It may be a corporation, partnership, joint venture,
or unincorporated association. It may also be organized under spe-
cial state statutes for cooperative ventures.
A "group" is generally composed of retailers attempting to
obtain the wholesale price, or secondary wholesalers attempting
to obtain the primary wholesaler price. However, the group may
be made up of any class of purchasers as long as there is an oppor-
tunity for the members to obtain a better price through the group
than that which would be available to them as individuals.
One of the more important differences between "groups" is
the degree to which they perform the function performed by the
members of the class they attempt to enter. They range from per-
forming no function whatever, to being nearly indistinguishable
* Mr. Palmer received an LL.B., with honor, from Chicago-Kent College of Law in
June, 1962 and was admitted to the Illinois Bar later that same year. Upon graduation, he
joined the Federal Trade Commission as a trial attorney. He remained with the F.T.C.
until May, 1965, at which time he became affiliated with the Chicago firm of Hinshaw,
Culbertson, Moelmann, and Hoban. He is currently a member of the Chicago, Illinois
and American Bar Associations.
1 Mennen Co., 4 F.T.C. 258 (1922), rev'd, 288 Fed. 774 (2d Cir. 1923).
2 Ibid.
3 Mid-South Distributors, FTC Dkt. No. 5767, aff'd, 287 F.2d 512 (5th Cir. 1961);
Cotton States, Inc., FTC Dkt. No. 5766, aff'd, 287 F.2d 512 (5th Cir. 1961).
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from the members of the higher class.4 This issue is at the heart
of the controversy, questioning whether function is important
only as a cost justification feature, or whether the function has a
bearing on the competitive effect of the group and should there-
fore go to the issue of injury to competition. It has also been sug-
gested as being an important element in determining who is the
"purchaser.'5
The original Clayton Act,6 three sections of the Robinson-
Patman Act, 7 and section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act'
have been utilized in determining the legal status of the "buying
group." At this stage, the application of the original Clayton Act
is only of historical interest and will be treated shortly.
The conflict begins when a group of retailers band together
and demand the wholesaler price. This has been done by the group
demanding that the orders of all its members be totaled for pur-
poses of a volume price or a volume rebate.9 The groups have also
demanded a pure functional discount. 0 The Commission has
issued its complaint against a manufacturer for refusing to grant
the group the wholesale price" and it has issued its complaint
against manufacturers charging that they violated the law by
granting the group the wholesale price. 12 Groups that received
the wholesale price have been charged with knowingly inducing
and receiving discriminatory prices, as well as with the illegal
receipt of brokerage. 3
Observing the metamorphosis of the legal status of the buying
4 National Parts Warehouse, FTC Dkt. No. 8039, aff'd, 346 F.2d 311 (7th Cir. 1965),
petition for cert. filed, 34 U.S.L. Week 3085 (U.S. Sept. 16, 1965) (No. 579).
5 Alhambra Motor Parts, 57 F.T.C. 1007 (1960), set aside in part and remanded, 309
F.2d 213 (9th Cir. 1962).
6 Section 2: Mennen Co., supra note 1.
7 Section 2(a): Standard Motor Products, Inc., 54 F.T.C. 814 (1957), afJ'd, 265 F.2d
674 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 826, 80 Sup. Ct. 73 (1959); Section 2(c): Atlas
Supply Co., 48 F.T.C. 53 (1951), and Central Retailer-Owned Grocers, Inc., FTC Dkt. No.
7121, order set aside, 319 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1962); Section 2(f): Alhambra Motor Parts,
supra note 5.
8 Section 5: Atlas Supply Co., supra note 7.
9 Standard Motor Products, Inc., supra note 7.
10 National Parts Warehouse, FTC Dkt. No. 8039, Commission Decision, Dec. 16, 1963,
aff'd, 346 F.2d 311 (7th Cir. 1965), petition for cert. filed, 34 U.S.L. Week 3085 (U.S. Sept.
16, 1965) (No. 579).
11 Mennen Co., 4 F.T.C. 258 (1922), rev'd, 288 Fed. 774 (2d Cir. 1923).
12 Standard Motor Products, Inc., supra note 7.
13 National Parts Warehouse, supra note 10; Central Retailer-Owned Groceries, Inc.,
FTC Dkt. No. 7121, order set aside, 319 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1962).
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group is particularly startling because the Federal Trade Commis-
sion's current position 14 is diametrically opposed to its original
position"5 and the courts seem about to do the same thing by
adopting the Commission's original position.' 6 This little drama
is also rife with irony as the Commission's original position was
that a manufacturer had to grant the "buying group" the whole-
sale price17 (a position which enabled the independent retailer to
take advantage of the same efficiencies and economies so success-
fully utilized by corporate chains), while the Commission's cur-
rent position is that the manufacturer may not grant the group
the wholesale price" (which obviously prevents the independent
retailer from improving his competitive posture by emulating the
practices of the corporate chains). The irony lies in the fact that
one of the primary and basic motives in enacting the Robinson-
Patman amendment to the Clayton Act was to enable the inde-
pendent merchant to weather the storm of the ever-encroaching
corporate chain.
THE EARLY CASES
The Commission's first venture into the group buying arena
involved the Mennen Company.'9 This case was brought under the
provisions of the original Clayton Act. It is of unusual interest
because the Commission has not only taken an about face in po-
sition, but also because the Commission is still litigating the same
issues some 40 years later.
Mennen was charged with violating section 2 of the original
Clayton Act. Mennen manufactured and distributed a long line
of toiletry articles. It sold to retailers at the dealer price and to
wholesalers at the wholesale price. The Commission found that
certain retailers organized corporate buying groups that pur-
chased in wholesale quantities, stocked the goods in question, and
sold only to retailers (mostly themselves). It went on to find that
respondent refused to classify the retailer cooperatives that func-
14 National Parts Warehouse, supra note 10.
15 Mennen Co., supra note 11.
16 Alhambra Motor Parts, 57 F.T.C. 1007 (1960), set aside in part and remanded, 309
F.2d 213 (9th Cir. 1962).
17 Mennen Co., 4 F.T.C. 258 (1922), rev'd, 288 Fed. 774 (2d Cir. 1923).
18 Dayton Rubber Co., FTC Dkt. No. 7604, Commission Opinion, Aug. 5, 1964.
19 Mennen Co., supra note 17.
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tioned as wholesalers, and thereby discriminated in price between
them and other wholesalers (non-group wholesalers).
The Commission stated that:
Such cooperative corporations originated in an effort, upon the
part of small retailers to find some means of purchasing products,
at prices which would enable them to meet the competition of
larger retail dealers which were able to purchase from manufac-
turers and wholesale distributors in larger quantities and at lower
prices than said small retail competitors. Said cooperative cor-
porations met the situation by offering retail customers wholesale
distribution, service at cost, and also offering to cut such cost to
a minimum.
20
The Commission concluded that Mennen's refusal to recognize
the retailer buying group as a wholesaler constituted a violation
of section 2 of the Clayton Act. A comparison of the Commission's
more recent Alhambra21 decision with the Mennen22 decision will
vividly demonstrate that the Commission condemned in Alhambra
the very practice that it rewarded in Mennen.
One year later, the Commission's landmark decision in Men-
nen was reversed by the Second Circuit.23 The court's holding is
often said to be founded on the following language:
Whether a buyer is a wholesaler or not does not depend upon
the quantity he buys. It is not the character of his buying but the
character of his selling which marks him as a wholesaler as this
court pointed out in Great Atlantic 8 Pacific Tea Co. v. Cream of
Wheat Company, supra. A wholesaler does not sell to the ultimate
consumer but to a "jobber" or to a "retailer." The persons who
constitute these mutual or cooperative concerns are buying for
themselves to sell to ultimate consumers, and not to other "job-
bers" or to other "retailers." The nature of the transaction herein
involved is not altered by the fact that they make their purchases
through the agency of a corporation ... 24
A close reading of the case indicates that this last paragraph was
merely a make-weight argument-pure obitur dictum.
The court in Mennen accurately analyzed the charge and de-
termined that the alleged injury was among purchasers from the
Mennen Company. The court reviewed the history of the Act and
20 Mennen Co., supra note 17, at 279.
21 Alhambra Motor Parts, supra note 16.
22 Mennen Co., supra note 17.
23 Mennen Co. v. FTC, 288 Fed. 774 (2d Cir. 1923).
24 Id. at 782.
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concluded that the Mennen Company did not violate the Clayton
Act as there was no provision in the Act involving the type of in-
jury charged in the case-secondary line injury. The court stated
that it was the intent of Congress:
[T]o exclude from the operation of the section mere competition
among "purchasers" from the "seller" or "person" who allowed
or withheld the discount and to include therein only competition
between such "seller" or "person" and the latter's own compe-
titors.25
The court had decided that it was impossible for Mennen's ac-
tivities to violate the law if only secondary line injury was charged,
before it launched into its definition of a wholesaler.
The Supreme Court in George Van Camp & Sons v. Ameri-
can Can Co.,26 said that the decision in Mennen was wrong, that
the Act did cover secondary-line injury. Not only was the Mennen
definition of a wholesaler dictum, the authority it cited as support
for its position only dealt with the subject incidentally. Likewise,
in Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Cream of Wheat Co.,27
A & P sought to enjoin Cream of Wheat from refusing to sell to
it. The Court upheld the defendant's right to sell to whomsoever
it chose. The definition of a wholesaler had no bearing on the case.
NONFUNCTIONING GROUPS
Mennen was destined to stand alone for nearly 40 years as the
only buying group case presented to the Commission where the
buying group actually performed the function performed by the
members of the level of competition the group tried to enter. An
understanding of the synthesis of buying group law would have
been simplified if the Commission had first heard Mennen in 1962
instead of 1922.
The Pittsburgh Plate Glass2s case is the logical place to begin
a discussion of buying group law. It not only was the first group
type case decided by the Commission after the enactment of the
Robinson-Patman Act, but it also involved the group least de-
serving of a favored price. Members of the Window Glass Manu-
25 Id. at 779.
26 278 U.S. 245, 49 Sup. Ct. 112 (1929).
27 227 Fed. 46 (2d Cir. 1915).
28 Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 25 F.T.C. 1228 (1937).
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facturers Association (WGMA) were charged with granting mem-
bers of the National Glass Distributors Association (NGDA) a
favored price in the sale of flat glass in violation of section 2 (a)
of the amended Clayton Act. The distributors were charged with
inducing and receiving a favored price from the manufacturers in
violation of section 2 (f) of the amended Clayton Act.
WGMA established a "Quantity Bonus" price. This price
was only available to members of NGDA. NGDA published "car-
load lot buyers" prices which were 7Y% higher than the "quan-
tity buyers" price. All nonmembers were forced to purchase car-
load lots of flat glass from or through NGDA members. The
manufacturers drop shipped the glass directly to the purchaser.
On sales to nonmembers, NGDA members paid the "quantity
buyers" price plus 2/2%, and charged the "quantity buyers"
price, plus 7/2%. The result was that members paid 712% less
than nonmembers as well as making 5% on purchases by nonmem-
bers. This case marks a practice that was obviously in violation of
the Clayton Act as it was nothing more than a trade association
demanding not only a better price than its nonmember competi-
tors, but also a commission on purchases by its nonmember com-
petitors. There was no ruse or disguise. It was nothing more than
commercial blackmail with a trade association's combined buying
power as a lever.
The second step in the development of the Robinson-Patman
buying group also involved a trade association, the Professional
Golfers Association (PGA).29 It is different only as the PGA had
an excuse for the favored price it received, while NGDA did not.
Golf ball manufacturers paid PGA a royalty for the privilege of
imprinting "PGA" on their golf balls. The PGA used some of
this money to promote the PGA and returned the rest to its mem-
bers. The PGA justified its position by alleging that "PGA" was
a valuable property and that the organization was entitled to be
compensated for its use. The Federal Trade Commission saw this
deal as no more than a way to grant PGA members a discount not
available to nonmembers and issued a section 2 (f) order against
the PGA for this practice.
29 Golf Ball Manufacturers Ass'n, 26 F.T.C. 824 (1938).
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The next step in the development of the Robinson-Patman
buying group involves the first organization created primarily to
induce a discriminatory price.30 A group of department stores
created a corporation to obtain a better price for its shareholders.
The corporation, AMC, utilized the combined buying power of
all its members in order to induce the special price. Suppliers that
cooperated with AMC, by granting it a rebate on sales to its mem-
bers, were classified as "preferred resources." The Commission
created no special doctrine or fiction in appraising the reality of
this scheme. It merely recited the facts and called it price discrim-
ination. This case was followed by a similar one, the Atlas Supply
Co. case, wherein several major oil companies formed a buying
group. 1 It differed from AMC in that AMC only induced a better
price for its members or received a rebate, while Atlas was paid
"commissions, brokerages, or other compensation in lieu there-
of"3 2 on sales to its members.
THE AUTOMOTIVE PARTS CASES
By 1953, the Commission was in the buying group field in
earnest. That year marked the beginning of the Commission's at-
tack on the automotive parts buying groups. In the automotive
parts field, the most common distributional pattern finds the
manufacturer selling to a warehouse distributor (WD), the WD
selling to a jobber, the jobber selling to a retailer, and the retailer
selling to a consumer. Sellers seldom, if ever, vary their prices from
those suggested by the manufacturers. The manufacturers distrib-
ute suggested price lists for every level of distribution.
The warehouse distributor normally purchases the manu-
facturer's products in large quantities and at the maximum dis-
count. In 1953, and earlier, it was common for manufacturers to
have a cumulative volume discount or rebate for its jobber cus-
tomers and a functional discount for WD's. Others sold to WD's
as well as jobbers on a volume discount basis. The volume rebate
tended to cause the WD's to purchase the bulk of their needs of a
product from one manufacturer, in order to qualify for the maxi-
30 Associated Merchandising Corp., 40 F.T.C. 578 (1945).
31 Atlas Supply Co., 48 F.T.C. 53 (1951).
32 Id. at 64.
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mum volume discount. The WD's maintained large staffs of sales-
men and often sold to jobbers in a multi-state area.
Jobbers were very much aware of the advantages of purchas-
ing large quantities. They began to investigate the possibilities of
obtaining large discounts by pooling their purchases. The scheme
decided upon was to set up a corporation. Each jobber was to own
one share of stock in the corporation. Order pads were printed
with the corporation's name. The jobbers then placed their orders
on the new corporation's order form. The forms were either sent
directly to the manufacturer or to the new corporation's office to
-be forwarded to the manufacturer. The manufacturer would then
ship the goods directly to the jobber, but bill the corporation, al-
lowing it the volume discount on the total purchases of all its
shareholders or the WD functional discount. The member-job-
bers received a share of the group's profit proportional to their
purchases from the group.
This scheme worked for some time, but it was inevitable that
it would eventually fail. The WD's price was usually about 20%
lower than the price paid by the jobber. The WD was granted the
price because it performed a valuable service to the manufacturer.
The WD provided local inventory, improved service, a large sales
organization, better credit, and reduced bookkeeping and billing.
A WD in a territory enabled the manufacturer not only to elimi-
nate a local warehouse, but also to have less capital tied up in
inventory. The manufacturer's sales and warehouse staff were
much smaller than they would have been if he had to sell and
ship to every small jobber handling his product. Overall, the WD
was well worth his keep.
The jobber buying group then came along and demanded
that it be treated in the same fashion as the WD. The group's ap-
proach to each manufacturer can only be based on speculation and
conjecture, but the only benefit it had to offer was that its mem-
bers would handle the manufacturer's product. The group had no
warehouse or salesmen. It performed no service. The only appar-
ent incentive to sell to the group was the fear that the group would
get the deal from a competitor and leave the manufacturer that re-
fused to deal with them out in the cold. The success of the groups
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make it obvious that the quid pro quo was enough, or perhaps it
might be better stated by saying that the manufacturer couldn't
afford not to give in.
There is little doubt that the manufacturers were not happy
with the situation. They not only had to give the group the right
to pool its purchases and thereby qualify for the maximum volume
discount or the WD functional discount, but they also had to per-
form the warehouse function as well. However, they were between
the devil (the group) and the deep blue sea (the group's members
purchasing from the competitor that allowed them the price
break), and had no alternative. The situation made the group
members happy as they made the WD profit as well as the normal
jobber profit. But, the whole thing didn't set well with the manu-
facturers (who were forced to take the WD price, but not get the
WD service), the legitimate WD's (who were completely fore-
closed from selling to group members as group members could
purchase as cheaply as the WD), and finally, the independent
jobber (who was paying the manufacturer or the WD the full
jobber price, while his competitor was paying a much lower
price).
The automotive parts "aftermarket" was loaded with "buying
groups." Since its first order in 1953, 83 the Commission has issued
19 cease and desist orders specifically prohibiting manufacturers
from granting nonfunctional groups a favored price. 4 Since its
first order in 1958,"5 the Commission has issued 9 cease and desist
33 Namsco, Inc., 49 F.T.C. 1161 (1953).
34 Namsco, Inc., supra note 33; Whitaker Cable Corp., 51 F.T.C. 958 (1955), aff'd, 239
F.2d 253 (7th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 938, 77 Sup. Ct. 813 (1953); Moog Indus.,
Inc., 51 F.T.C. 931 (1955), afl'd, 238 F.2d 43 (8th Cir. 1956), afJ'd, 355 U.S. 411, 78 Sup. Ct.
377 (1958), rehearing denied, 356 U.S. 905, 78 Sup. Ct. 559 (1958); E. Edelmann and Co.,
51 F.T.C. 978 (1955), aff'd, 239 F.2d 152 (7th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 941, 78 Sup.
Ct. 426 (1958); C. E. Niehoff and Co., 51 F.T.C. 1114 (1955), aff'd as modified, 241 F.2d 37
(7th Cir. 1957), modified, 355 U.S. 411, 78 Sup. Ct. 377 (1958), rehearing denied, 355 U.S.
968, 78 Sup. Ct. 531 (1958); P and D Mfg. Co., 52 F.T.C. 1155 (1956), aff'd, 245 F.2d 281
(7th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 884, 78 Sup. Ct. 150 (1957); Standard Motor Products,
Inc., 54 F.T.C. 814 (1957), aff'd, 265 F.2d 674 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 826, 80
Sup. Ct. 73 (1959); Federal-Mogul Bower Bearings, Inc., 54 F.T.C. 1628 (1958); Guaranteed
Parts Co., 55 F.T.C. 433 (1958); Thermoid Co., 55 F.T.C. 518 (1958); Neapco Products, Inc.,
55 F.T.C. 708 (1958); The Eis Automotive Corp., 55 F.T.C. 1473 (1959); Airtex Products,
Inc., 55 F.T.C. 1754 (1959); Northeast Capital Corp., 57 F.T.C. 429 (1960); American Ball
Bearing Co., 57 F.T.C. 1259 (1960); Perfect Equipment Corp., 58 F.T.C. 65 (1961); Borg-
Warner Corp., 58 F.T.C. 629 (1961); Perfection Gear Co., 59 F.T.C. 598 (1961); Tung-Sol
Electric, Inc., FTC Dkt. No. 8514, Commission Opinion, Sept. 12, 1963.
35 Warehouse Distributors, Inc., 55 F.T.C. 188 (1958).
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orders specifically prohibiting buying groups and their individu-
ally named jobber members from receiving a favored price
through a nonfunctional buying group 6
A. Order Desk Groups
The original automotive parts cases caused the Commission
and the courts little trouble. These groups were little more than
order desks. Members would send their orders to the group and
the individual orders were forwarded to the manufacturers. The
manufacturers would drop ship the goods directly to the member.
The group merely forwarded orders, billed the members, and paid
the suppliers. It was determined that the jobber members and not
the corporate groups were the "purchasers." This was established
by a showing that the group was merely a funnel, and not always
even that, for group member's orders. The corporate group had
no life or function of its own. Section 4 of the Robinson-Patman
Act provided the group no immunity as it only declares that:
Nothing in this Act shall prevent a cooperative association
from returning to its members, producers, or consumers the whole,
or any part of, the net earnings or surplus resulting from its
trading operations, in proportion to their purchases or sales from,
to, or through the association.3
7
Similarly, "the fact that earnings which result from illegal activity
may be distributed to the association's members does not insulate
the association from prosecution for the illegal activity.
38
The Commission was able to establish that there was little
likelihood that the discount was cost justified, because the manu-
facturers treated group and nongroup members exactly alike, ex-
cept for billing, and it was clear that any savings in billing that
existed could not give rise to sufficient cost savings to justify the
price discrimination.
36 Warehouse Distributors, Inc., supra note 35; Midwest Warehouse Distributors,
Inc., 55 F.T.C. 414 (1958); Hunt-Marguardt, Inc., 55 F.T.C. 910 (1958); Borden-Aicklen
Auto Supply Co., 55 F.T.C. 1279 (1959), afl'd, 287 F.2d 512 (5th Cir. 1961); D and N Auto
Parts Co., 55 F.T.C. 1279 (1959), afJ'd, 287 F.2d 512 (5th Cir. 1961); American Motor
Specialists Co., 55 F.T.C. 1430 (1959), afJ'd, 278 F.2d 225 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364
U.S. 884, 81 Sup. Ct. 169 (1960); Albright's, 55 F.T.C. 1556 (1959); Automotive Southwest,
Inc., 57 F.T.C. 590 (1960); Southwestern Warehouse Distributors, Inc., 57 F.T.C. 611 (1960).
37 15 U.S.C.A. § 13b.
38 American Motor Specialties Co. v. FTC, 278 F.2d 225, 229 (2d Cir. 1960),
affirming, 55 F.T.C. 1430 (1959), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 884, 81 Sup. Ct. 169 (1960).
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B. Warehousing Groups
Traditionally, manufacturers of automotive replacement
parts have discriminated in price .between primary and secondary
wholesalers. The warehouse distributor receives a 20% allowance
for the function it performs. The function is to service the jobber.
The bells tolled long and hard for the "order desk" groups, but
they were making too much money to give up so easily. They fig-
ured that the basic difference between their operation and that
of a legitimate warehouse distributor was that their suppliers drop
shipped to their members, while legitimate WD's received the
bulk of their merchandise in their warehouse and reshipped it to
their customers. Accordingly, a number of groups acquired or
built warehouses. If a WD could get 20% as a functional allow-
ance, why couldn't a group perform the same function and receive
the same allowance?
The thinking of the buying groups that a warehouse would
change them from fish to fowl demonstrated a basic misunder-
standing of why the functional discount to WD's was not a viola-
tion of the Robinson-Patman Act. The fact the WD's had ware-
houses was merely secondary. The crucial aspect was that the WD's
did not compete with the jobbers. Their function is to sell to
jobbers. Function is determined by trade classification and not
physical accouterments. The difference in price between jobbers
and WD's is in conformity with the Robinson-Patman Act not be-
cause the WD maintains a warehouse, but because WD's do not
compete with jobbers. Functional pricing does not provide jobber
buying groups with warehouses with an impenetrable barrier
through which the FTC cannot enter. As long as the group job-
bers continue to compete with other jobbers, they function as
jobbers. As jobbers, they are only entitled to the jobber price.
The Commission approaches a buying group with a ware-
house under the same theory that it approaches a group without
a warehouse. The first issue is who is the "purchaser," the group
as an entity or the individual member jobbers? If it is determined
that the individual members are the "purchasers," this results in
a price discrimination of 20%, as nonmember jobbers pay the
regular jobber price, while member jobbers pay the WD price
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through the group. By virtue of Automatic Canteen, 9 the Com-
mission must also show that the member jobbers had no reason to
believe that the price difference was cost justified.
The only difference in a warehousing group and a nonware-
housing group, involves cost justification. The test of Automatic
Canteen40 is easily met in the nonwarehousing group as the only
difference in treatment by suppliers is that they bill the group
headquarters and not the individual members. This clearly would
not result in a 20% savings. In the warehousing situation, how-
ever, the picture changed. Drop shipments are eliminated. The
group makes large purchases and maintains large inventories. It
continues to handle the billing.
1960 saw the result of the Commission's first formal action
against a buying group where warehousing was a factor. On Octo-
ber 28, 1960, the Commission issued a cease and desist order in the
matter of Alhambra Motor Parts.4' The Commission did not write
an opinion in this matter. It adopted the initial decision of the
hearing examiner. The hearing examiner treated the Alhambra
matter much as the "order desk" group cases had been treated in
the past. He merely made mention of the fact that a portion of the
products were warehoused. He did, however, indicate that "the
allowance of a warehouse distributor's discount to Southern Cali-
fornia Jobbers, Inc. (S.C.J.), as herein found, cannot be defined as a
functional discount ..... 42The hearing examiner based this finding
on his conclusion that the group, SCJ, was merely a device by
which jobbers obtained the WD price.
In 1961, two more group cases involving warehousing came
out. Hearing examiners issued initial decisions in Ark-La-Tex
39 "The Commission need only to show, to establish its prima facie case, that the
buyer knew that the methods by which he was served and quantities in which he
purchased were the same as in the case of his competitor. If the methods or quantities
differ, the Commission must only show that such differences could not give rise to
sufficient savings in the cost of manufacture, sale or delivery to justify the price differential,
and that the buyer, knowing these were the only differences, should have known that they
could not give rise to sufficient cost savings. The showing of knowledge, of course, will
depend to some extent on the size of the discrepancy between cost differential and price
differential, so that the two questions are not isolated. A showing that the cost differences
are very small compared with the price differential and could not reasonably have been
thought to justify the price difference should be sufficient." Automatic Canteen Co. v.
FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 80, 73 Sup. Ct. 1017, 1027-8 (1953).
40 Ibid.
41 57 F.T.C. 1007 (1960), set aside in part and remanded, 309 F.2d 213 (9th Cir. 1962).
42 Id. at 1019.
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Warehouse Distributors, Inc.4 and Automotive Job.bers, Inc.,"
holding that these two groups and their members had violated sec-
tion 2 (f) of the Robinson-Patman Act by knowingly inducing and
receiving illegal discriminatory prices. Although each of these two
groups warehoused some of their products, not much was made of
it. Again, the two initial decisions read much like the older "order
desk" type group cases.
Automotive Jobbers, Inc. did not appeal the initial decision.
In January of 1962, the Commission adopted the initial decision
of the hearing examiner.45 Ark-La-Tex did appeal to the Com-
mission.
In June of 1962, the hearing examiner issued his initial deci-
sion in National Parts Warehouse.46 NPW looked more like a
warehouse operation than any of the other groups that had come
under the Commission's scrutiny. NPW warehoused 80% of its
products. It had a salesman. It sold to nonmembers. It was a lim-
ited partnership, while many of the others had been corporations.
This meant that the members or limited partners, had very little
to say about its day-to-day activities. The hearing examiner evalu-
ated these factors, and in finding that section 2 (f) of the Robin-
son-Patman Act had been violated by NPW and its partners, he
concluded:
N.P.W. performs some of the services usually performed by a
warehouse distributor, but the prime question is not what func-
tions are performed or who controls the operation of the partner-
ship, but whether the respondent jobbers receive the price dis-
crimination.4 7 (Emphasis added.)
The Commission's earlier opinion in Alhambra had been ap-
pealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Four months after
the initial decision in NPW, the Ninth Circuit issued its opinion
in Alhambra.4 The court upheld the Commission's order regard-
ing drop shipments or brokerage, but remanded the case back to
the Commission for further consideration of SCJ's warehousing
activities and, in that regard, the "purchaser" issue.
43 FTC Dkt. No. 7592, Hearing Examiners Initial Decision, Oct. 13, 1961.
44 FTC Dkt. No. 7590, Hearing Examiners Initial Decision, Oct. 13, 1961.
45 60 F.T.C. 19 (1962).
46 FTC Dkt. No. 8039, Hearing Examiners Initial Decision, June 12, 1962.
47 Id. at 14.
48 Alhambra Motor Parts v. FTC, 309 F.2d 213 (9th Cir. 1962).
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The "purchaser" issue in Alhambra involved a determination
of whether the jobber members as individuals, or the group, as a
separate entity, are the "purchasers." The warehousing issue in-
volved the court's conclusion that SCJ performed a number of
services such as warehousing, delivery, distribution of price lists
and catalogs and the like, for its suppliers and members. The court
determined that these services may have saved the groups' sup-
pliers money, as compared to dealing directly with jobbers, and
that "the burden was on the Commission to show that the cost
savings could not be commensurate with the price differential.
' 49
This cost savings issue stems from a proviso in section 2 (a)
of the Robinson-Patman Act,50 that provides
[T]hat nothing herein contained shall prevent differentials which
make only due allowance for differences in the cost of manufac-
ture, sale or delivery resulting from the differing methods or quan-
tities in which such commodities are to such purchasers sold or
delivered.
In a proceeding charging a manufacturer with violating section
2 (a) of the Act, by discriminating in price between customers, the
manufacturer has the burden of establishing cost justification, if
any exists. In a section 2 (f) case, charging a customer with know-
ingly inducing a discriminatory price, the burden is on the Com-
mission to establish that there is little likelihood that the differen-
tial was cost justified.
5 1
On June 5, 1963, subsequent to Ark-La-Tex's appeal to the
Commission, the Commission remanded the Ark-La-Tex matter
to the hearing examiner.
5 2
On December 16, 1963, the Commission issued its opinion in
National Parts Warehouse.5 3 The Commission concluded that
NPW had violated section 2 (f) of the Robinson-Patman Act, and
accordingly, issued a cease and desist order. The Commission's
NPW decision involves, among others, the same two issues that
were remanded to the Commission in the Alhambra case,-who is
the "purchaser," and cost justification.
49 Id. at 219.
50 15 U.S.C.A. § 13.
51 Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 73 Sup. Ct. 1017 (1953).
52 FTC Dkt. No. 7592, "Order Vacating Initial Decision and Remanding Case to
Hearing Examiner."
53 National Parts Warehouse, FTC Dkt. No. 8039, Commission Decision, Dec. 16, 1963.
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In NPW, the Commission determined that the group organi-
zation was the agent of the members, and, therefore, that the mem-
bers were the "purchasers." The rationale behind this conclusion
was that:
(T)he jobber partners, in reserving to themselves the absolute legal
right to receive all of their creature's profits, have made themselves
responsible for the acts by which it "earns" those profits. Every-
thing that NPW does is done not for itself, but for those who re-
ceive its profits. It is, therefore, their agent.
54
Determination of the cost justification issue involves a very
different problem than the "purchaser" issue. The "purchaser"
issue facilitates the utilization of rules of law of rather general ap-
plicability. The cost justification issue does not. It is basically a
question of fact. The question is whether the group device was so
constituted that it saved suppliers an amount equal to or greater
than the discount it granted the group, as compared to the sup-
pliers' costs in serving direct buying jobbers. This involves deter-
mining what services a supplier provides a direct buying jobber;
which of these services the supplier can eliminate by selling
through a group rather than directly; the cost to the seller of the
eliminated services; and finally, does the cost to the seller of the
eliminated services equal or exceed the discount granted. If it does,
the discount is cost justified; if it doesn't, the discount is not cost
justified.
In considering the possible areas of cost savings to manufac-
turers dealing with NPW, the Commission discussed freight, bill-
ing, selling expenses and warehousing. After developing these
areas in detail, Chairman Dixon, in his majority opinion,"5 con-
cluded:
(T)hat respondents' operation of NPW, far from lessening their
supplier's cost of selling to and servicing the 55 jobber partners, has
actually increased these particular cost items for the manufacturers.
NPW was subsequently affirmed by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and a petition for certiorari has
been filed in the United States Supreme Court.5"
54 Id. at 12.
55 Id. at 29.
56 National Parts Warehouse v. FTC, 346 F.2d 311 (7th Cir. 1965), petition for cert.
filed, 34 U.S.L. Week 3085 (U.S. Sept. 16, 1965) (No. 579).
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Pursuant to the Ninth Circuit's remand in Alhambra,57 hear-
ings were held in Los Angeles. On Novenber 20, 1964, the hear-
ing examiner issued his initial decision dismissing the complaint.8
Although he found the members of SCJ to be the "purchasers,"
he also found that it had not been established that the discounts in
question were not cost justified.
The hearing examiner stated that "it may be inferred that
the functional discounts paid to independent WD's are substan-
tially cost justified. . . ."59 He then outlined the services performed
by SCJ and went on to say that "as far as its manufacturer-sup-
pliers were concerned, these services performed for them by SCJ
were comparable to the cost-saving services performed by other
WD's."6 ° He then held that "there is no reason to believe that the
performance of substantially similar services by SCJ did not result
in comparable savings in cost to the manufacturers selling through
SCJ."61 The hearing examiner's decision in Alhambra 2 is cur-
rently on appeal to the Commission.
The most recent Commission activity in the automotive buy-
ing group field is the hearing examiner's second initial decision in
Ark-La-Tex Warehouse Distributors, Inc. 63 The hearing examiner
concluded that the suppliers of Ark-La-Tex discriminated in price
by selling to the members of Ark-La-Tex through Ark-La-Tex, at
lower prices than the prices charged competing jobbers; that this
discrimination was or may have been injurious to competition;
and that the members knew or should have known that the dif-
ferentials were not cost justified. The hearing examiner found that
these activities violated section 2 (f) of the Robinson-Patman Act,
and, therefore, issued a cease and desist order.
The Commission has only issued one cease and desist order
against a supplier selling to a buying group with a warehouse.
6 4
The Commission's opinion followed the principles enunciated in
57 Alhambra Motor Parts v. FTC, 309 F.2d 213 (9th Cir. 1962).
58 Alhambra Motor Parts, FTC Dkt. No. 6889, "Supplemental Initial Decision on
Remand of Proceeding," Nov. 20, 1964.
59 Id. at 34.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
62 Alhambra Motor Parts, supra note 58.
63 FTC Dkt. No. 7592, Hearing Examiner's Second Initial Decision on Remand of
Proceedings, Feb. 18, 1965.
64 Dayton Rubber Co., FTC Dkt. No. 7604, Commission Opinion, Aug. 5, 1964.
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the earlier "automotive parts cases," with the exception that it also
deals with the issue of the boundaries of "official notice." That
case, Dayton Rubber, is currently on appeal in the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals. In another recent case, outside the field of auto-
motive parts, the Commission issued a cease and desist order
against a supplier selling to a buying group.6 5 Kaplan was charged
with violations of subsections (a), (d), and (e) of section 2 of
the amended Clayton Act, by engaging in discriminatory practices
in the sale of products to a department store buying group, Asso-
ciated Merchandising Corp. (hereinafter referred to as AMC). As
noted earlier, AMC was found to have violated section 2 (f) in
1945.6 The Commission issued another section 2(f) complaint
against AMC and its members on November 24, 1964.67
THE RESULTS
The first page of this article states that in spite of vigorous
Commission activity, buying groups, and in particular, automotive
parts buying groups, continue to flourish and grow. Such being
the case, how can one assess the results of the Commission's activi-
ties? It is impossible to speculate as to how many groups did not
form due to the presence and attitude of the Commission. There
is no doubt that the number is substantial. However, there are
areas where there has been noticeable progress in this field, partic-
ularly in automotive parts.
The annual volume discount constitutes one of the most
notorious and injurious methods of discriminatory pricing. It in-
jures competition in at least two ways. The first is at the primary
level of competition. A customer tends to limit his purchases to one
supplier, because each additional purchase may lower the price.
This results in the supplier's competitor being cut off from the cus-
tomer. The second is at the secondary level of competition. The
volume buyer is able to use his large buying power to obtain a
lower price than his smaller competitor. This is in spite of the fact
that there may not be savings accruing to the supplier by selling to
65 Joseph A. Kaplan and Sons, FTC Dkt. No. 7813, Commission Opinion, Nov. 15,
1963.
66 Associated Merchandising Corp., 40 F.T.C. 578 (1945).
67 FTC Dkt. No. 8651.
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the large volume customer. The volume customer may use the
better price to destroy his competitor.
This iniquitous system of pricing was rife in the automotive
aftermarket before the Commission began its buying group activi-
ties. This type of pricing has nearly disappeared since then.
Another area of progress involves the metamorphosis of the
order desk buying group into nearly a full service warehouse. The
order desk buying group performed no economic service in the
channel of distribution. As far as the physical distribution of prod-
ucts are concerned, the order desk buying group did not exist.
It did nothing for suppliers or members. Its sole purpose was to
enable its members to obtain a discriminatory price.
Today, many automotive buying groups maintain substantial
warehouse facilities. They often provide delivery or pay freight.
Some have salesmen. They have come a long way from their be-
ginning as order desks. They provide benefit to their suppliers
and to their members.
68
THE FUTURE
This is the most ticklish problem of all. In his concurring
opinion in Monroe Auto Equipment Company,"D Chairman Dixon
stated:
There always has been a substantial sentiment in the country
that small local enterprises should be encouraged and that their
members should grow. That emotion was translated into legisla-
tion such as the Robinson-Patman amendment to the Clayton Act.
To some, our strong enforcement of this Act now seems a childish
clinging to a bygone era. And it is, of course, true that today's dis-
sent may, in fact, be tomorrow's majority view.
In his dissenting opinion in National Parts Warehouse, Com-
missioner Elman stated:
We should hesitate to prevent the independent jobbers from
adopting a new marketing method which, by eliminating one step
68 "As a result of numerous Commission actions against buying groups through which
jobbers of automotive parts have aggregated their purchases to obtain discriminatory
discounts, or against the manufacturers which have granted them the discounts, some
jobber groups have abandoned their simple 'order-desk' method of business, whose only
function was to combine the separate purchase orders of their members, and have
developed warehouse operations which perform the same economic function, and are
compensated by parts manufacturers on the same basis, as traditional warehouse dis.
tributors." (Citations omitted.) Dissenting Opinion, Commissioner Elman, National Parts
Warehouse, FTC Dkt. No. 8039, Commission Decision at 3, Dec. 16, 1963.
69 FTC Dkt. No. 8543, Commission Decision at 4, July 28, 1964.
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in their channel of distribution, would increase their competitive
strength vis-a-vis that of their more fully integrated competitors,
at least in the absence of facts showing that such an effort by the
independents to meet competition is, itself, anticompetitive in its
results. There are no such facts here.
7 0
Commissioner MacIntyre, in his speech on cooperatives, delivered
before the Antitrust Section of the American Bar Association,
August 11, 1964, stated:
With the exception of hard core violations involving preda-
tory practices, in the case of small business or farmers' coopera-
tives, it may be expected that the Commission will increasingly
look at the economic and competitive function of the particular
cooperative and where permissible, will apply the rule of reason.
These three statements, by the Chairman and the two senior
Commissioners of the Federal Trade Commission, make it evident
that the Commission is extremely concerned with its finding itself
in the position of prosecuting small business. However, it has no
choice but to enforce the law equally among the large and the
small. The Commission cannot allow the group members to de-
stroy their smaller competitors, in order to make the group mem-
bers more effective in their competition with their larger com-
petitors.
The dilemma is now clear. How can small business be allowed
to equate the efficiencies of their larger, vertically-integrated com-
petitors? The present type group organization is not appropriate
because it results in injury to the group members' smaller, inde-
pendent competitors. Therefore, the group members must devise
a method to eliminate the competitive injury to their competitors.
Can this be done within the framework of the Robinson-Patman
Act?
If the group were to open membership to any and all of its
members' competitors, at a nominal cost, would the problem be
solved? This would enable all competitors to take advantage of
the lower price. If this were to happen, where would the injury
be? The theory that the availability of the lower price would
eliminate competitive injury, finds support in two areas.
In the Report of the Attorney General's National Committee
to Study the Antitrust Laws, March 31, 1955, it is stated on
pages 164-5:
70 FTC Dkt. No. 8039, Commission Decision at 3, Dec. 16, 1963.
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Nor should a competitive price reduction be singled out as
responsible for "injury" if alternative means of access to goods at
the lower price are in any event available to the buyer.
In Tri-Valley Packing Association v. FTC,7 ' the court stated:
To be more specific, if the lower price would have been avail-
able to the nonfavored buyer in the same market where the favored
buyer made his purchase, the probability of competitive injury
due to the fact that the nonfavored buyer paid more for the
product is not the result 'of price discrimination, but of the non-
favored buyer's failure to take advantage of the opportunity,
equally available to him, of buying at the same low prices.
Price discrimination would be eliminated if the nonfavored
buyers chose to join the group and take advantage of the benefits
of the group. If the nonfavored buyer chose not to join, the price
discrimination would still exist, but would it be the proximate
cause of the injury? It seems that if any injury existed, it would
be due to the nonfavored buyers own unwillingness to take ad-
vantage of the lower price.
This is only one possible solution. It is not perfect. For
example, what happens to the independent warehouse distributor
if all his customers join the group? There is no doubt that he
would have to adapt in some way, or face a substantial loss of
business. But, would he have any remedy? He would still be pay-
ing the same price as the group. There would be no price discrim-
ination. Without price discrimination, there is no violation of
the Robinson-Patman Act.
71 329 F.2d 694, 703-4 (9th Cir. 1964).
